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G.: Future Interests--Contract of Purchase or Lease with Option
CASE COMMENTS
both seem to have the same goal, that being to place all the matter
relevant to the case before the triers of facts unless the evidence
is clearly excluded by some rule or principle of law.
Thus, it would seem that the principal case is correct. It is
certainly a step in the right direction and it certainly is another
example of how the courts often attempt to limit the scope of
exclusionary rules of evidence such as the Weeks doctrine. One
case which seems to be quite similar, at least on the facts, to the
principal case is State v. Slamon, 73 Vt. 212, 50 Atd. 1097 (1901).
There it was said that a letter improperly taken from the defendant
was inadmissible to impeach the writer, a witness for the defendant.
This statement appears to be contra to the rule of the principal
case. This case, however, has been overruled sub silentio: Vermont
now repudiates the Weeks doctrine, State v. Suitor, 78 Vt. 391, 63
Atl. 182 (1906).
It is difficult to say just what the West Virginia court will do
in the light of the decision in the principal case. In State v. Wills,
91 W. Va. 659, 114 S.E. 261 (1922), the doctrine of the Weeks
case was adopted. The court, recognizing that there was a decided
split among the states, said, "If we err, we would rather err on the
side of liberty, and therefore we adopt as the better rule that laid
down by the Supreme Court of the United States." Id. at 677, 114
S.E. at 266. The Weeks doctrine seems to be wrong since it is
founded upon (1) a misapplication of a substantive rule of law and
(2) an overextension of the protection of the Fifth Amendment.
If the basic rule is wrong then certainly the rule in the principal
case which deviates therefrom must be correct. This decision
would seem to illustrate the fact that even the Supreme Court is
not sure that the Weeks rule is on firm ground. When this is
pointed out to the West Virginia court perhaps it will overrule
the Wills case, supra, and adopt the orthodox rule.
C. F. S., Jr.

FUTURE INTERESTS-CONTRACT

OF PURCHASE

OR LEASE WITH

OPTION.-A and B entered into a written agreement which by its

own terms was denominated a "deed".

Elsewhere in the instrument

appeared the words "leased premises",

rent", "rental",

'term"

"grant", and "demise". Under this agreement A was to have possession and use of commercial realty, in return for which he was to
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pay B $1200 per year for 28 years, and at the end of such term he
could get a conveyance of the property by the payment of $1.00 to
B. P, trustees, derive their title from B; D, from A. P seeks a
declaration of rights and obligations of the parties to the instrument. Held, that the instrument was a lease with an option to
purchase at the end of the term, and since the term was twentyeight years, the option was void ab initio as being in violation of
the rule against perpetuities. First Huntington National Bank v).
Gideon-Broh Realty Co., 79 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1953) (3-2 decision).
In the case of Spelman v. City of Parkersburg,35 W. Va. 605,
14 S.E. 279 (1891), there was involved an instrument similar to the
one in the instant case in all of its salient provisions; in fact, it
even contained the so-called option to purchase for one dollar at
the end of the period. The court said this was clearly a contract
of purchase. In Crowell v. Brim, 191 Ga. 288, 12 S.E.2d 585 (1940),
cited in the dissenting opinion in the principal case, the instrument
there construed contained the terms "lease" and "yearly rental",
yet the court held it to be a contract of purchase, citing four other
Georgia cases as authority. In one of these cases so cited, Gibson v.
Alford, 161 Ga. 672, 132 S.E. 442 (1926), the instrument contained
the provision that if there was a default in payment of any of the
sums due under the agreement, the party so obligated to pay would
be evicted as a tenant holding over. Still the court held it to be
a contract of purchase and not a lease with an option to purchase.
It is readily seen that such terms are not determinative of the construction to be placed upon the instrument.
From the conflict of authority, it must be noted that documents such as that in the principal case present a rather complex
problem of construction. Shirley v. Van Every, 159 Va. 762, 167
S.E. 345 (1933), lays down the proposition that courts prefer to
construe doubtful documents as bilateral contracts rather than unilateral contracts. The reason for this is the policy of the court
favoring mutuality of obligation. Turner v. Hall, 128 Va. 247, 104
S.E. 861 (1920). It necessarily follows then that the courts would
prefer to construe the instrument in the instant case as a contract
of purchase rather than a lease with an option to purchase, since
the latter is a unilateral contract.
In view of all the foregoing considerations, it is submitted that
the better reasoning is found in the decisions which hold that an
instrument such as this one is a contract of purchase and not a
lease with an option to buy. If this instrument is a contract of
purchase, D's predecessors had a vested equitable title to the proper-
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ty as soon as the contract was executed. Where there is a present
vesting of a legal or equitable estate in land by an agreement, the
rule against perpetuities does not bar a subsequent acquisition of
the remaining estate, whether legal or equitable. McKibben v.
Pioneer Trust 8c Savings Bank, 365 Ill. 369, 6 N.E.2d 619 (1937).
The West Virginia court held that the instrument was a lease
with an option to purchase, and therefore, D's predecessors in title
had no vested estate until he exercised the option. Since the
period at the end of which the option was to be exercised exceeded
twenty-one years, it was void ab initio as being a violation of the
rule against perpetuities. Granting, for the sake of rebuttal, that
it is a lease with an option to purchase, the American authorities
(infra) seem to be well in accord that the rule against perpetuities
should not apply.
The court in the instant case failed to make an important
distinction, that of options in gross and options appendant to a
lease. The former arises when a stranger to the land has the right
to exercise the option. The latter. arises when the person having
the right to exercise the option is already the lessee of the property.
In London & S.W.R. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch.D. 562 (1880), cited by
the West Virginia court to support the majority opinion, the
option is in gross. The opinion in that case made no mention of
options in gross and options appendant to a lease.
It seems to be the established rule in England that options in
gross and options appendant both violate the rule against perpetuities. A curious paradox in English law was an instance where
equity refused to enforce the promise as being too remote under
the rule against perpetuities but the covenantee was allowed money
damages at law for the breach of the covenant. Worthing Corp. v.
Heather, 2 Ch.D. 532 (1906). This was an option appendant to a
lease. In Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236 Mass.
138, 128 N.E. 177 (1920), a case concerning an option in gross,
specific enforcement was denied by equity on the ground of the
rule against perpetuities, and money damages were denied at law
for the same reason.
There are not many cases in the United States on this par.
ticular point. According to Lanzebutting, Options to Purchase
and the Rule against Perpetuities, 17 VA. L. REv. 461 (1931), it is
the general rule in the United States that options appendant to a
lease are not repugnant to the rule against perpetuities, while
options in gross do violate the rule. Banks v. Hastie, 45 Md. 207
(1876), Hollander v. Central Meat Co., 109 Md. 131, 71 Ati. 442
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(1931); Koegh v. Peck, 316 Ill. 318, 147 N.E. 266 (1925). As far
as research shows, the principal case is the first American case to
hold a lease with an option to purchase in violation of the rule
against perpetuities.
However, it is generally accepted here and in England that
leases with a perpetual option to renew the lease do not violate the
rule against perpetuities. Thaw v. Gaffney, 75 W. Va. 229, 83 S.E.
983 (1929). There seem to be two bases for this: (1) such leases
existed before the rule against perpetuities came into being; (2)
such leases do not violate the policy of the rule, though they may
violate the letter of the rule. Abbot, Leases and the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 27 YALE L.J. 878 (1918). The purpose of the rule
against perpetuities has been variously stated, but may be summarized by saying it is to prevent one owner from unduly and
unreasonably diminishing the value of ownership to his successors.
It has as its companion rule, the rule against restraints on alienation, both having the same policy. Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv. 638 (1938).
If a lease with a perpetual option to renew is not repugnant
to the policy of the rule against perpetuities, a lease with an option
to purchase should also not be repugnant to the rule. In the
case of a perpetual option, there is the equivalent of two fees
running simultaneously in the same property, and this could go on
forever. On the other hand, in the case of a lease with an option
to purchase, one of the two estates is going to be terminated at a
definite time. This fact should make the latter property more
freely alienable than is the former property. Couple this with the
fact that the rule against perpetuities is a rule of policy, and there
results a good basis for widening the exceptions to the rule to
include leases with an option to purchase.
There are other reasons to hold a lease with an option to
purchase to be good as an exception to the rule against perpetuities.
Since the lessee has the chance to buy the land, this will give him
an incentive to improve it. Improvement of land is another public
policy recognized by the courts. It is a system of land tenure advantageous to both lessee and lessor. It is the way a person with
limited means may buy and pay for land with the profits he makes
from the land. Comment, 35 YALE L.J. 261 (1925).
C. W. G.
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